Solving the ‘Paradox’ of Language Development
Lecturer: Richard Moore
- Pre-verbal communication requires communicative intentions.
- Communicative intentions require ToM.
- ToM requires language.
Are these three claims jointly inconsistent? If so, which should we reject? If not, why do they appear jointly inconsistent?
Slides
References
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