Communication and Cooperation

Challenges to the Cooperative Communication
Hypothesis

Summarising Tomasello's (2008) argument



Humans alone acquire(d) language because we alone are capable of 'Gricean cooperative communication'. This requires:

- Gricean communicative intentions (via Grice 1957)
- Joint action (via Bratman 1999)
- Cooperative reasoning (via Grice 1989)

Challenges to Tomasello's (2008) argument



The components that Tomasello identifies as necessary for language development may all be too challenging for pre-verbal infants.

- Is Gricean communication too difficult for infants? What about apes?
 (Week 6)
- Is joint action possible for infants? And for apes? (Week 5)
- Are infants capable of cooperative reasoning? (This week)

Challenges to Tomasello's (2008) argument

Moreover, the empirical foundations of Tomasello's claim seem less robust than he claims.

- Might chimpanzees be Gricean communicators? Some understand pointing – Tomasello's sine qua non. (Week 6)
- There is some evidence that chimpanzees engage in joint action (Duguid et al. 2018; Melis & Tomasello 2018). (Week 5)
- There is also evidence that chimpanzees communicate to inform (e.g. Crockford et al. 2012).

Evaluating Tomasello's Cooperative Communication Hypothesis





Perhaps the empirical stories tell us just that there is more continuity between humans and great apes?

- The precursors of language are present in them
- But the why do only humans evolve to use language?


Communication and Cooperation

How cooperative is communication?

The Cooperative Communication Hypothesis


- 1. Structural Claims (Tomasello 2008; Jankovic 2013):
 - Is communication always a form of joint action?
 - Does interpretation always require cooperative reasoning?
- 2. Motivational Claim (Tomasello, 2008):
 - Do audiences interpret only where communicators act with cooperative motives?

Conversations are often cooperative (Grice 1989)



- S and H take it in turns to present ideas, listen to and unpack one another's messages, in pursuit of common conversational direction.
- "I'm sorry, I didn't understand. Could you elaborate?"
 - ≈ Bratman's supporting one another to pursue subgoals

Communication is not always conversational



- S shouts obscene messages at H from the top of a bridge. H understands them, without paying attention, and chooses to ignore them.
 - Less obvious that this involves agents acting together (Moore 2018).

Are pro-social motives always necessary?


(Moore 2018; see also Sperber & Wilson 1996)

The inarticulate despot




- A despot issues poorly constructed, barely intelligible orders; terrified subjects strive to understand him.
- Such subjects are motivated only by the desire to avoid harm.
 - What matters here is expected payoff (benefit/processing cost).

Is cooperative reasoning always needed?



- H must recover content of S's message based on utterance (x).
- Cooperative reasoning is valuable tool but not the only way to succeed (Moore 2017, 2018).

Mechanisms of cooperative reasoning



- Counterfactual reasoning (Goodman & Frank 2016)
 - Underlying assumption of cooperation (following Grice 1989)

Modelling inference (loosely via Mercier & Sperber 2016)

- Interpretation
 - Prediction about S's intended outcome (communicative goal)
 - Based on evidence (x) addressed to H by S
- Interpretation could be reached through numerous processes
 - Prediction, modelled probabilistically
 - Best guess
 - Prior experience

Communication and cooperation

Some conclusions

Communication can be more or less cooperative

- Where conversational demands are greater, sustained attention and cooperation more important
- Interlocutors can be motivated to interpret for a number of reasons
- Cooperative reasoning not the only route to successful interpretation
 - Where interlocutors can make use of cooperative reasoning,
 communication may work better

Explaining language evolution and development

 Cooperative reasoning is unnecessary – so infants and great apes may both be capable of Gricean communication

albeit to difference degrees

We need not posit an 'improbable moral revolution'
 (Habermas 2011) after the Homo-Panini clade split (6mya)

 Instead, changes may have been more gradualistic, perhaps driven by ecological change

 potentially still tied to Stag Hunt contexts (Tomasello e 2012; Moore 2017) Praeanthropus afarensis, by Mike Keesey

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